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I. INTRODUCTION 
The year 2017 marked the centennial of the collective naturalization 
of Puerto Ricans under the terms of the Jones Act of 1917.1 Prevailing 
debates over the Jones Act seem to hover around two myths. A prevailing 
narrative argues that the Jones Act of 1917 was the first law to grant Puerto 
Ricans United States (U.S.) citizenship. In addition, too many writers 
claim, without offering any historical evidence, that the Congress used the 
citizenship provision of the Jones Act “as a vehicle for drafting Puerto 
Rican men into the U.S. military” and World War I more generally.2 Both 
claims are incorrect. 
                                                                                                             
∗ Associate Professor with a joint appointment in the Department of Political Science and 
El Instituto, University of Connecticut; Ph.D. University of Massachusetts. As always, I 
would like to thank Sheila I. Velez, Blanca Silvestrini José Javier Colón Morera for their 
continued thoughtfulness, encouragement and support. 
1 48 U.S.C.S. § 731 (LexisNexis); see generally José A. Cabranes, Citizenship and the 
American Empire, Notes on the Legislative History of the United States Citizenship of 
Puerto Ricans (1979) (for an overview of the legal history of the Jones Act citizenship 
provision). 
2 Nelson A. Denis, War Against All Puerto Ricans, Revolution and Terror in America’s 
Colony 139 (2015); but see Harry Franqui-Rivera, Why Puerto Ricans Did Not Receive 
Citizenship So They Could Fight in WWI (Dec. 31, 2017, 
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Drawing on Derrick Bell’s notion of interest convergence3, this note 
argues that white elites in the United States decided to grant Puerto Ricans 
U.S. citizenship more than a decade before the enactment of the Jones Act 
and that this decision was motivated by more interests than recruiting 
cannon fodder for World War I. Central to my argument is that at the time, 
Congress, the author of the citizenship legislation for Puerto Rico, was a 
plural and complex institution comprised of white elites. Congress enacted 
legislation extending citizenship to Puerto Ricans because of some 
altruistic sense, but rather because the interests of white elites converged 
in particular moments in time. This note is divided in three parts. Part I 
provides a summary of Derrick Bell’s notion of interest convergence. The 
idea is to frame the parameters of Bell’s thesis. Part II contextualizes the 
case of Puerto Rico through overviews of the island’s territorial status and 
the history of the extension of U.S. citizenship to Puerto Ricans. Part III 
explains how Bell’s notion of interest convergence can help expand the 
debates over the intent of the enactment of the Jones Act beyond a 
parsimonious focus on the military interests of the United States empire. 
My goal is to open the door for more serious research of the history of the 
extension of U.S. citizenship to Puerto Rico. 
II. DERRICK BELL’S NOTION OF INTEREST CONVERGENCE 
Derrick A. Bell Jr.’s use of the notion of interest convergence to 
criticize some of the liberal responses to the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
Brown v. Board of Education4 stands as a pillar for LatCrit theory, as well 
as other critical approaches to U.S. law.5 Central to Bell’s argument is a 
critique of the depoliticizing interpretation of the Court’s ruling in Brown 
adopted by liberal legal actors and scholars, interpretations that shifted the 
focus away from the social justice concerns raised by racist inequalities to 
questions about the desire of black Americans to acquire rights to associate 
with whites and the “neutrality” of the Court’s reasoning. Bell contended 
“that the decision in Brown to break with the Court’s long-held position 
on these issues cannot be understood without some consideration of the 
decision’s value to whites, not simply those concerned about the 
immorality of racial inequality, but also those whites in policymaking 
positions able to see the economic and political advances at home and 
                                                                                                             
https://centropr.hunter.cuny.edu/centrovoices/chronicles/why-puerto-ricans-did-not-
receive-us-citizenship-so-they-could-fight-wwi. 
3 See generally, Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest 
Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980). 
4 See generally, Brown v. Bd of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
5 See Bell Jr., supra note 3. 
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abroad that would follow abandonment of segregation.”6 Bell’s definition 
of interest convergence was anchored on three arguments. 
First, Bell argued, “the decision helped to provide immediate 
credibility to America’s struggle with Communist countries to win the 
hearts and minds of emerging third world peoples.”7 At the height of the 
Cold War, the United States propaganda machine sought to discredit 
Communist countries as totalitarian regimes that oppressed their subjects. 
Racist inequalities and Jim Crow laws reproduced the image that the 
United States capitalist government was also a totalitarian regime, a 
regime that tolerated the unequal treatment of its citizens. For Bell, the 
narrative of United States international credibility was premised on 
affirming the motto “all men are created equal,” a motto that was 
undermined by racist inequalities and Jim Crow laws8. 
Second, Bell continued, “Brown offered much needed reassurance to 
American blacks that the precepts of equality and freedom so heralded 
during World War II might yet be given meaning at home.”9  Accordingly, 
if whites expected black soldiers to die in foreign campaigns for the 
principles of “equality and freedom,” the United States needed to promote 
these principles at home. Veterans returning from foreign or international 
campaigns needed reassurance that they were fighting and dying for 
principles that they could live by at home. More importantly, by 
addressing inequalities at home, whites could discourage the involvement 
of black veterans in domestic protests. 
Third, Bell concluded, “there were whites who realized that the south 
could make the transition from a rural, plantation society to the sunbelt 
with all its potential and profit only when it ended its struggle to remain 
divided by state-sponsored segregation.”10 Bell argued that some whites 
viewed Jim Crow laws as an obstacle to the industrialization of southern 
states. For some white elites, segregation undermined the United States’ 
economic and commercial potential. In other words, segregation was bad 
for business. 
III. CONTEXTUALIZING THE PUERTO RICAN EXAMPLE 
Part of the challenge of applying Bell’s notion of interest convergence 
to Puerto Rico, and unincorporated territories more generally, is 
                                                                                                             
6 Id. at 524. 
7 Id. 
8 See generally Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age 
of Colorblindness (2012) (for an analysis of how the vestiges of Jim Crow laws are still 
prevalent in modern-day American society). 
9 See Bell Jr., supra note 3 at 524. 
10 Id. at 525. 
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contextualizing the relationship among the U.S. empire, the constitutional 
status of Puerto Rico and the citizenship status of Puerto Ricans. Bell’s 
critique sought to explain the status of black citizens who acquired a 14th 
Amendment citizenship as a result of their birth in the United States and 
who further resided in the United States. In contrast, unincorporated 
territories like Puerto Rico are selectively ruled as foreign possession in a 
domestic or constitutional sense. They are selectively ruled as separate and 
unequal parts of the United States. Moreover, historically, Congress has 
enacted a wide array of citizenship statutes extending different types of 
citizenships to Puerto Rico and the other territories.11 To be sure, at times 
some of these citizenship statutes have treated Puerto Rico as a foreign 
territorial possession and others have treated the island as a part of the 
United States. But let me explain. 
IV. PUERTO RICO’S CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS 
Between 1898 and 1901, the United States invented a new territorial 
law and policy to govern Puerto Rico and the other territories annexed in 
the aftermath of the Spanish-American War of 1898. The Department of 
War invented a new territorial status, Congress normalized it in 1900, and 
the Supreme Court institutionalized it in 1901. As I have explained 
elsewhere, the new territorial law and policy both departed from and 
combined elements of prior colonialist and imperialist traditions of U.S. 
territorial expansionism in important ways.12 All territories annexed by the 
United States since 1898 have been governed under the terms of the new 
territorial law and policy. 
To be sure, the United States government simultaneously developed 
two traditions of territorial expansionism between the founding and 1898, 
namely the colonialist and imperialist traditions. United States colonialist 
expansionism was premised on the annexation of territories that could be 
settled by U.S. citizens, subsequently organized, and eventually admitted 
as states into the Union.13 Colonized territories were governed as 
                                                                                                             
11 See generally, ARNOLD H. LEIBOWITZ, DEFINING STATUS: A COMPREHENSIVE 
ANALYSIS OF U.S. TERRITORIAL POLICY 144-145 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2d ed. 
2014); see generally Charles R. Venator-Santiago, Territorial Citizenship Today: Four 
Interpretations, 50 PS: Political Science and Politics, 515, 515-519 (2017) (for an analysis 
of four of the interpretations of the status of people born in unincorporated territories which 
are currently up for debate). 
12 See generally CHARLES R. VENATOR-SANTIAGO, PUERTO RICO AND THE ORIGINS OF 
U.S. GLOBAL EMPIRE: THE DISEMBODIED SHADE, 1 (Denise Ferrerira da Silva et.al, 1st ed. 
2015). 
13 See Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 448 (1857). 
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constitutional parts of the United States.14 In contrast, the imperialist 
tradition was premised on the strategic occupation of territories for 
military and/or economic purposes. Territories subject to imperialist 
occupation were ruled as foreign possessions located outside of the United 
States for constitutional purposes.15 United States policymakers sought to 
develop a new tradition of territorial expansionism that was not bound to 
past precedents and that would be flexible to the local needs of the U.S. 
military. 
The United States military occupied Puerto Rico on July 25, 1898 and 
imposed a two-year military dictatorship to prepare the island’s local 
institutions for U.S. rule.16  In his final report as governor of Puerto Rico, 
Brigadier-General Davis, the last military governor of the island, 
summarized the military’s role in shaping the new territorial status within 
the emerging U.S. empire: 
The scope of these orders was very wide. Almost every 
branch of administration-political, civil, financial, and 
judicial-was affected by their provisions. It may be that 
the military governors exceeded their authority when they 
changed the codes, the provisions of which were not in 
conflict with the political character, institutions, and 
Constitution of the United States; but in the absence of 
instructions to the contrary, it was conceived to be the 
privilege and duty of the military commanders to make 
use of such means with a view to adapting the system of 
local laws and administration to the one which, judging 
from precedents, Congress might be expected to enact for 
the island, thus preparing the latter for a territorial régime 
when Congress should be ready to authorize it. It has been 
pointed out that the course adopted is understood to have 
been, tacitly at least, approved by Congress, for with two 
slight exceptions, specified in the (Foraker Act of 1900), 
every order promulgated by the military governors has 
been confirmed by Congressional enactment, has become 
part of the supreme law of the land, and will so remain 
                                                                                                             
14 See Loughborough v. Blake, 18 U.S. 317, 319 (1829) (holding that the United States 
federal government has the power to impose a direct tax on the District of Columbia). 
15 See Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. 603, 615 (1850). 
16 See JOSÉ TRÍAS MONGE, EL CHOQUE DE DOS CULTURALS JURIDICAS EN PUERTO RICO, 
EL CASE DE LA RESPONSABILIDAD CIVIL EXTRACONTRACTUAL (Orford, N.H; Equity P.B., 
1st ed. 1991); see also Report of the Military Governor of Porto Rico on Civil Affairs, H.R. 
DOC. No. 56-2, at 101 (1902). 
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until abrogated or changed by Congress or by the 
legislative assembly of the island (emphasis added).17  
The United States formally annexed Puerto Rico on December 10, 
1898, amidst the occupation and under the terms of the Treaty of Paris.18 
United States military governors continued to rule Puerto Rico until 1900, 
when Congress created a civil government for the island under the terms 
of the Foraker Act.19 
In addition to creating a civil government for Puerto Rico, the Foraker 
Act contained a provision that treated Puerto Rico as a foreign territorial 
possession. Specifically, Section 3 extended the so-called Dingley Tariff 
of 189720 to the island imposing a 15% tariff on merchandize trafficked 
between Puerto Rico and the mainland.21  The tariff treated an annexed 
territory as a foreign possession that belonged to, but was not a part of the 
United States. On April 2, 1900, during the debates over the Foraker Act, 
Senator John C. Spooner (R-WI) summarized the logic informing the new 
territorial status in the following passage: 
I will not quibble about words. Territory belonging to the 
United States, as I think Puerto Rico and the Philippine 
Archipelago do, become a part of the United States in the 
international sense, while not being at all a part of the 
United States in the constitutional sense.22 
Less than a year later, the Supreme Court began to affirm the new 
insular or territorial law and policy in a series of rulings generally known 
as the Insular Cases of 1901.23 Specifically, the core principles of the 
ensuing constitutional interpretation were established in Justice Edward 
D. White’s concurring opinion in Downes v. Bidwell.24 Justice White 
began by rejecting the prevailing colonialist25 and imperialist26 
interpretations and adopted a third view, which has since been described 
                                                                                                             
17 Trías Monge, supra note 14 at 47. 
18 Treaty of Paris, Sp.-U.S., Dec 10, 1898, 30 Stat. 1754. 
19 See generally Foraker Act of 1900, ch. 191, 31 Stat. 77 (1900). 
20 See Dingley Act of 1897, ch.11, 30 Stat. 151 (1897). 
21 Foraker Act of 1900, ch.191, §3, 31 Stat. 77, 77-78 (1900). 
22 33 CONG. REC. 3608, 3629 (1900) (statement of Sen. Wallop). 
23 See generally Juan R. Torruella, The Supreme Court and Puerto Rico: The Doctrine 
of Separate and Unequal, 100 HARV. L. REV. 450 (1988); Christina Duffy Burnett, United 
States: American Expansion and Territorial Deannexation, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 797 (2005); 
EFRÉN RIVERA RAMOS, AMERICAN COLONIALISM IN PUERTO RICO: THE JUDICIAL AND SOCIAL 
LEGACY (First Markus Wiener Publishers 2nd ed. 2007). 
24 Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 287 (1901). 
25 Id. at 340. 
26 Id. at 290. 
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as the doctrine of territorial incorporation. Central to Justice White’s 
interpretation were several key principles. First, Justice White argued, 
“Congress in legislating for Porto Rico [sic] was only empowered to act 
within the Constitution and subject to its applicable limitations, and that 
every provision of the Constitution which applied to a country situated as 
was that island, was potential in Puerto Rico.”27 Congress, he further 
argued, possessed the power to determine what constitutional provisions 
were applicable in Puerto Rico. So long as the United States recognized 
the application of fundamental, albeit undefined, rights, Congress 
possessed the power to enact legislation that extended or withheld 
applicable constitutional provisions. Second, Justice White began to 
describe Puerto Rico as an unincorporated territory, that is a territory that 
is not meant to become a state of the Union and one that can be selectively 
ruled as a foreign territorial possession in a domestic or constitutional 
sense.28 Underlying Justice White’s interpretation was a disdain for the 
non-white inhabitants of Puerto Rico and the other newly annexed 
unincorporated territories. The ensuing constitutional doctrine of 
territorial incorporation that grew out of Justice White’s interpretation 
affirmed the separate and unequal status of Puerto Rico and Puerto Ricans 
within the nascent U.S. global empire. 
V. PUERTO RICO’S CITIZENSHIP LEGISLATION 
Since the United States annexed Puerto Rico, Congress has debated 
and enacted a wide array of bills and laws conferring three different types 
of citizenship on Puerto Ricans. In 1899, the U.S. Senate ratified one 
annexation treaty with a special citizenship provision.29 Between 1898 and 
1952, Congress enacted eleven laws or statutes containing citizenship 
provisions for Puerto Rico.30 Since 1898 and the time of this writing, 
however, Congress debated upwards of 100 bills containing citizenship 
                                                                                                             
27 Id. at 293. 
28 Id. at 341-342. 
29 Treaty of Paris, art. IX, Sp-U.S., Dec 10, 1898, 30 Stat. 1754. 
30 Foraker Act of 1900, ch. 191, 31 Stat. 77, §7 (1900); Bureau of Immigration and 
Naturalization Act of 1906 (“BINA”), Pub. L. No. 59-338, 34 Stat. 596 §30 (1906); Naval 
Service Appropriations Act of 1914 (“NSAA”), Pub, L. No. 63-121, ch. 130, 38 Stat. 392 
(1914); Jones Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 64-368, 39 Stat. 951, §5 (1917); Naturalization of 
Resident Aliens of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-144, 40 Stat. 542 (1918); Porto Rico Civil 
Revenues Act of 1927 (§5a), Pub. L. No. 69-797, 44 Stat. 1418 (1927); Puerto Rico Civil 
Government Act of 1934 (§5b), Pub. L. No. 73-477, 48 Stat. 1245 (1934); Puerto Rico 
Civil Government Act of 1938 (§5c), Pub. L. No. 75-521, 52 Stat. 377 (1938); Nationality 
Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-853, 54 Stat. 1137, §§201(a), 202 (1940); To Amend the 
Organic Act of Puerto Rico, Pub. L. No. 80-776, 62 Stat. 1015 (1948); Immigration and 
Nationality Act of 1952 (“INA of 1952”), Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163, §302 (1952). 
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provisions for Puerto Rico.31 Overtime, Congress extended three different 
types of citizenship to Puerto Rico, namely a Puerto Rican citizenship 
(1899-1934), a naturalized (individual and collective) citizenship (1906-
1940), and birthright or jus soli citizenship (1940 to the present).32 
Following the U.S. annexation of Puerto Rico in 1898, Congress 
invented local nationalities or “citizenships” to govern the inhabitants of 
Puerto Rico and the other unincorporated territories.33 In the case of Puerto 
Rico, the Treaty of Paris of 1898, the treaty providing for the U.S. 
annexation of Puerto Rico, contained a provision treating the insular or 
island-born inhabitants of the newly annexed territory as local or Puerto 
Rican nationals rather than U.S. citizens. More importantly, unlike 
peninsular (Spain)-born residents of Puerto Rico, insular-born Spanish 
citizens residing in the island were barred from either retaining their 
Spanish citizenship or acquiring a U.S. citizenship. The second clause of 
Article IX established that Congress could subsequently enact legislation 
extending the civil and political rights to the island’s inhabitants.34 The 
subsequently enacted Foraker Act of 1900 used the notion of Puerto Rican 
citizenship to codify the local nationality invented by the Treaty of Paris.35 
Yet, because the Foraker Act did not change Puerto Rico’s territorial 
status, birth in the island was tantamount to birth outside of the United 
States for citizenship purposes. Under the prevailing naturalization 
process, petitioners were required to renounce their allegiance to a 
sovereign before they could naturalize. Puerto Rican citizens were unable 
to comply with this requirement, namely, to renounce their allegiance to 
the United States in order to undergo a naturalization process to acquire a 
U.S. citizenship!  Puerto Rican citizens were governed under the racist 
doctrine of separate and unequal, included within the polity, but barred 
from equal membership within the Anglo-American polity. 
However, in 1906 federal lawmakers agreed to grant Puerto Ricans 
the ability to acquire a U.S. citizenship via naturalization. Starting with the 
Bureau of Naturalization Act of 1906 (BINA), Congress began to enact 
legislation creating special waivers enabling individual Puerto Ricans to 
travel to the mainland or an incorporated territory and undergo the 
                                                                                                             
31 For original copies of all bills containing citizenship provisions for Puerto Rico 
debated in Congress since 1898 see Puerto Rico Citizenship Archives Project, 
ScholarsCollaborative.org, http://scholarscollaborative.org/PuertoRico/ (last visited Dec. 
31, 2017). 
32 See generally Charles R. Venator-Santiago, Mapping the Contours of the History of 
the Extension of U.S. Citizenship to Puerto Rico, 1898-Present, 29 CENTRO J. 38, 38-55 
(2017) (for a more substantive overview of this history) 
33 Treaty of Peace, U.S.-Spain, art. IX, Dec. 10, 1898, 30 Stat. 1754, at 1759. 
34 Id. 
35 Foraker Act of 1900, §7, 31 Stat. 77, at 79. 
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prevailing naturalization process.36 The BINA was subsequently amended 
in 1914 and 1918 creating additional waivers for Puerto Ricans to 
naturalize.37 In 1917 Congress began to enact legislation providing for the 
collective naturalization of the residents of Puerto Rico. Section 5 of the 
Jones Act of 1917 established simple condition permitting Puerto Rican 
citizens residing in Puerto Rico to choose to retain their status quo or do 
nothing and acquire a U.S. citizenship by not doing anything. Aliens and 
alien children residing in Puerto Rico were allowed to undergo a simple 
administrative procedure to naturalize under the terms of Section 5.38 The 
citizenship provision of the Jones Act was subsequently amendment in 
1927, 1934, 1938, 1940, and 1948.39 Again, because the Jones Act did not 
contain a provision that incorporated Puerto Rico or implicitly changed its 
territorial status, birth in Puerto Rico was tantamount to birth outside of 
the United States for citizenship purposes. This meant that persons born in 
Puerto Rico under the terms of the Jones Act, and its subsequent 
amendments, could only acquire a derivative form of jus sanguinis (blood 
right) citizenship, or a naturalized citizenship status. 
In 1940, Congress began to enact citizenship legislation extending 
birthright or jus soli citizenship to Puerto Rico. The Nationality Act of 
1940 began by treating Puerto Rico as a part of the United States for sole 
purposes of extending birthright citizenship to the island.40 In addition, 
drawing on the Citizenship Clause of the 14th Amendment, the Nationality 
Act included a provision explicitly extending birthright or jus soli 
citizenship to the island.41 Congress subsequently affirmed the citizenship 
provisions for Puerto Rico in 1948 and 1952.42 To be sure, all persons born 
in Puerto Rico after January 13, 1941, the date of the law’s enactment, are 
born in the United States for the purpose of acquiring a birthright or 
“native-born” citizenship status. Yet, it is important to emphasize that 
while the Nationality Act of 1940, and its subsequent iterations, treated 
Puerto Rico as a part of the United States for the purpose of extending 
birthright citizenship to the island, it did not explicitly incorporate or 
                                                                                                             
36 Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1906 (BINA), §30, 34 Stat. 596, at 
606-607. 
37 See id. 
38 Jones Act of 1917, §5, 39 Stat. 951, at 953. 
39 See id. 
40 Nationality Act of 1940, §101(d), 54 Stat. 1137. 
41 Id. §201(a), 54 Stat. 1137, at 1138. For a description of the legislative background and 
intent of each provision, see U.S. COMM. TO REVIEW THE NATIONALITY LAWS, 
76TH CONG., REP. ON NATIONALITY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES (hereafter 
President’s Committee Report), Part 1, v (Comm. Print 1938). 
42 To Amend the Organic Act of Puerto Rico, Pub. L. No. 80-776, 62 Stat. 1015 (1948); 
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (“INA of 1952”), Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 
163, §302 (1952). 
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change Puerto Rico’s territorial status. These laws merely treat Puerto 
Rico as an incorporated territory for the sole purpose of extending 
birthright citizenship to the island. 
In sum, I want to emphasize several important points. First, since 
annexing Puerto Rico, Congress has extended different types of 
citizenship to Puerto Rico without changing the island’s territorial or 
rather constitutional status. Second, whereas Congress treated island-born 
Puerto Ricans who acquired a U.S. citizenship prior to 1940 as naturalized 
citizens, those born after the enactment of the Nationality Act of 1940 were 
treated as native-born citizens. While it true that some of the citizenship 
legislation for Puerto Rico retroactively extended a birthright citizenship 
status to persons born in Puerto Rico after the ratification of the Treaty of 
Paris on 1899, it is important to recognize that Congress treated Puerto 
Rican-born citizens as naturalized rather than native-born citizens. 
VI. INTEREST CONVERGENCE AND THE EXTENSION OF U.S. 
CITIZENSHIP TO PUERTO RICO 
The legislative history of the federal status legislation for Puerto Rico 
and citizenship statutes for Puerto Ricans are replete with racist 
commentary. Historically, federal law and policymakers invoked racist 
narratives of Anglo-Saxon exceptionalism to legitimate the separate and 
unequal status of the Puerto Rican territory and its inhabitants.43 The 
question is: why would racist federal lawmakers agree to grant citizenship 
to racially inferior Puerto Ricans living in an unincorporated territory? 
Legislative reports informing the debates over the BINA of 1906, the first 
statute granting Puerto Ricans U.S. citizenship, as well as the legislative 
histories of bills leading to the enactment of the Jones Act of 1917, 
demonstrate that Bell’s notion of interest convergence can explain why 
even racist white elites ultimately supported enabling Puerto Ricans to 
acquire U.S. citizenship. 
As noted above, one of the dimensions of interest convergence is a 
concern with the public image of the U.S. government in international 
forums. United States law and policymakers are interested in fostering an 
international representation of the U.S. as a just nation were all “men” are 
treated equally. In a 1906 Senate Report accompanying S. 2620, a 
                                                                                                             
43 See for example Rubin Francis Weston, RACISM IN U.S. IMPERIALISM, THE 
INFLUENCE OF RACIAL ASSUMPTION ON AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1893-
1946 (1972). It is important to note that at least one federal district court declared that the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Gonzalez v. Williams, 192 U.S. 1 (1904) established that Puerto 
Ricans were racially eligible to naturalize and acquire a U.S. citizenship under the terms of 
the BINA of 1906. See In re Giralde, 226 F. 826 (1915). 
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citizenship bill for Puerto Rico, Senator Joseph B. Foraker (R-OH), also a 
supporter of the extension of citizenship to Puerto Rico, included several 
letters he had received from President Theodore Roosevelt supporting the 
collective naturalization of Puerto Ricans. In a letter sent to Senator 
Foraker on March 26, 1906, President Roosevelt wrote: 
My dear Senator Foraker: As you know, Mr. Larrinaga 
has been appointed as one of the American delegates to 
the Pan-American Congress in Brazil. It would be a real 
misfortune not to have the citizenship bill for Porto Rico 
[sic] pass at this session, prior to his going there. I cannot 
believe there will be any opposition to the bill and I most 
earnestly hope that it will be put through as speedily as 
possible. I know how heartily you sympathize [sic] with 
it.44 
The fact Congress had not granted citizenship to Puerto Ricans 
reaffirmed the perception that the United States was an empire holding a 
colony of subjects who shared a Spanish heritage with Latin Americans. 
United States efforts to enforce President Roosevelt’s “big stick” policy 
and to demand more democratic reforms in Latin America were ultimately 
undermined by the perception that the U.S. was an empire with double 
standards. 
White were also concerned with domestic dimensions of extending 
citizenship to Puerto Ricans. Opponents of granting citizenship to Puerto 
Rican feared that citizenship would enable racially inferior Puerto Ricans 
to vote, influence government and even demand statehood for the island. 
They were concerned that Puerto Ricans could use their potential 
citizenship to challenge their separate and unequal status. In contrasts, 
other white elites saw the granting of citizenship as a sort of psychological 
appeasement of Puerto Ricans. To be sure, in an accompanying Senate 
Report supporting H.R. 20048, a 1913 version of what became the Jones 
Act of 1917, Senator Miles (R-WA) argued: 
On the contrary, emphasis should be laid upon the fact 
that the grant of citizenship to those described in the bill 
does not in any way involve the right of suffrage nor 
implicate directly or indirectly the question of statehood. 
Citizenship will give them certain personal legal rights 
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INHABITANTS OF PORTO RICO TO BE CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES, S. 
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and privileges both in their relations to the local 
government and in their status abroad; will tend to 
increase their self-respect and to cultivate and develop a 
larger capacity for self-government. It will promote 
contentment and satisfaction among the people with their 
allegiance to the United States, but does not involve the 
right to participate in the government nor affect in any 
particular the question of statehood, any more than the 
privilege of citizenship to those born within the United 
States proper giver then the right of suffrage.45 
To be sure, some white elites saw the collective naturalization of 
Puerto Ricans as a form of political domestication and psychological 
appeasement designed to give the non-white inhabitants of the island a 
greater degree of associational rights. Stated differently, citizenship would 
enable white elites to include Puerto Ricans within the empire, while 
simultaneously excluding them from equal membership in the polity. 
White elites also believed that granting citizenship to Puerto Ricans 
would help industrialize Puerto Rico and enhance their economic and 
commercial interests in the island. To be sure, in a 1908 House Report 
accompanying H.R. 393, Representative Henry A. Cooper (R-WI) 
explained his support for the collective naturalization of Puerto Ricans by 
arguing that “Porto Rico [sic] is now, and always will be, of much value 
to the United States because of the island’s large business interests and 
possibilities and its important and rapidly increasing trade with this 
country.”46 Representative Cooper argued that Puerto Rico had already 
become a part of the United States for commercial purposes. Presumably 
providing for the collective naturalization of Puerto Ricans would cement 
the relationship between the island and the mainland making it easier to 
invest, trade, and sustain long-term commercial endeavors in the island. 
The legislative histories of the citizenship statutes for Puerto Rico 
document additional reasons for granting citizenship to Puerto Ricans. For 
example, again citing Representative Cooper, many white elites believe 
that Puerto Rico was strategically situated to assist in the protection of the 
Panama Canal.47 To this extent, citizenship could help cement the loyalty 
of Puerto Ricans to the United States. The point, however, is that ample 
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evidence exists to substantiate the claim that Congress granted citizenship 
to Puerto Ricans when the interests of white elites converged. 
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